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Abstract
The textbook New-Keynesian (NK) model implies that the labor share is pro-cyclical con-
ditional on a monetary policy shock. We present evidence that a monetary policy tightening
robustly increased the labor share and decreased real wages and labor productivity during
the Great Moderation period in the US, the Euro Area, the UK, Australia, and Canada. We
show that this is inconsistent not only with the basic NK model, but with a wide variety of
NK models commonly used for monetary policy analysis and where the direct link between
the labor share and the markup can be broken.
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1 Introduction
Widely used structural models for monetary policy analysis that rely on price (and wage)
rigidities establish clear transmission mechanisms from monetary policy shocks to real eco-
nomic activity and inflation. One of the key mechanisms of transmission in these models
operates through the redistribution between labor income and firm’s profits (markups). In
the basic model, when prices are rigid, a monetary policy (MP) tightening should lead to an
increase in the markup and a decrease in the income share of labor as prices cannot react
immediately to the fall in demand. This effect reduces unit labor costs leading to a down-
ward pressure on inflation. For this transmission mechanism to be operative, MP shocks
should affect the cyclical behavior of the labor share in ways that are consistent with these
theoretical predictions. Despite its importance, studies on the effect of MP shocks on the
labor share are very scarce.1
Our first objective is to fill this gap and provide a cross-country comprehensive study on
the effects of monetary policy on the labor share. Using state of the art VAR identification
techniques, we present a new and robust set of facts for the US, the Euro Area, UK, Australia,
and Canada. Furthermore, we look at the components of the labor share, namely real wages
and labor productivity. This is needed to identify the channels through which the labor
share response operates. Once we establish the empirical facts, we address our second
objective. We ask the question: are current models of economic fluctuations widely used for
monetary policy analysis able to jointly match the response of the labor share, real wages,
and productivity? This is an important question given the above mentioned reliance of
models on specific MP transmission channels.2
The first contribution of the paper is empirical. We uncover a new (and very robust) set
of stylized facts: cyclically, a MP tightening (easing) increases (decreases) the labor share
and decreases (increases) real wages and labor productivity. These facts are robust across
time periods, different countries, different measures of the labor share, different identification
methods, different information sets, and immune to composition bias. To address concerns
about identification of MP shocks, we use a recursive Cholesky ordering, sign restrictions,
and several external instruments in the spirit of Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and
Ravn (2013) to identify MP surprises.
To analyze whether theories are consistent with these robust stylized facts, we study the
properties of different families of models commonly used in macroeconomics for the analysis
of monetary policy. We first briefly discuss the intuition behind some canonical models to
understand the margins affecting the labor share. We then look at the quantitative properties
of larger models incorporating a combination of different rigidities. We derive measures of
the labor share from the models and look at their response to a MP shock. This is carried out
using a three step approach. We first look at the likelihood that these models can generate
the observed responses obtained in the VAR by using a Prior Sensitivity Analysis (PSA)
approach. Secondly, we identify the key model parameters driving the response of the labor
share, real wages, and productivity using Monte Carlo Filtering (MCF) techniques. Third,
once these key parameters are identified, we estimate them by matching the models’ impulse
responses to those of the VAR.
1Ramey (2016), for instance, reviews the available evidence on MP shocks using all the available state of the
art identification techniques in VAR models. However, there is no mention of the impact on real wages and labor
productivity (the components of the labor share).
2Beyond the importance for understanding transmission, these questions are also important to understand
the cyclical redistributive effects of MP at the factor level. Redistributive effects of MP between the owners
of capital and labor can have important consequences. They can affect household income inequality depending
on the structure of capital ownership, and can also lead to inter-generational redistribution as different cohorts
live off changing proportions of labor and profit income. These aspects can have important political economy
consequences, but we do not go as far in this paper.
2
To advance some intuition, it is well known that, in the simplest version of the New-
Keynesian (NK) model (see Gal´ı 2015), the labor share is equal to the inverse of the price
markup (the marginal cost). This makes the labor share pro-cyclical (the price markup is
counter-cyclical) conditional on a MP shock, which is at odds with the empirical evidence
we find here. However, this direct correspondence between the price markup and the labor
share does not necessarily hold in other versions of the model such as those that, for instance,
consider a cost channel of monetary policy or search and matching frictions. We also consider
the role played by wage rigidities and fixed production costs. In other words, we look at
different families of models that can break the relationship between markups and the labor
share, since they are potentially able to generate labor share dynamics that differ from the
canonical NK model.
The key result from our quantitative analysis of models, and our second contribution, is
that there is a puzzling mismatch between data and theory. This is not just a feature of the
basic NK model, but carries over in richer setups widely used for MP analysis. We show
that, in a frictionless labor markets model, high nominal wage inertia is able to reproduce
the response of the labor share to an unexpected MP shock. At first sight, this would be an
obvious solution to the puzzle. However, this comes at the cost of obtaining counter-factual
(counter-cyclical) responses of real wages. Our impulse response matching estimates show
that several models do a reasonable job at matching the responses of standard macroeconomic
variables to an identified MP shock, but they are unable to reproduce the response of the
labor share.
Related literature
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature that focus on the cyclical behavior
of markups and labor market variables conditional on demand shocks.3 The conditional
correlation of the labor share to demand shocks is still empirically and theoretically an
open question. It has to be noted, however, that most of the related studies focus on the
dynamics of markups. Whilst markups are not directly observable and require the use
models to derive data counterparts, the labor share is directly observable. In our approach,
we provide an analysis of the conditional correlations of measured labor shares in the data
and their implied behavior in NK models. I.e. we start off analyzing national accounts based
measures and then contrast them with consistent model-implied measures. Furthermore, our
contributions relative to the extant literature below are twofold: on the empirical side, we
provide systematic, robust, as well as cross-country evidence and, on the theory side, we
focus on the role of a wide set of real and nominal frictions and not only on price stickiness.
Empirically, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2011) showed,
only for the US and in a broader context, how wages and labor productivity respond pro-
cyclically to an MP shock. However, they do not provide direct evidence on the labor share,
and their focus is on the persistence of output and inflation inertia.4 Nevertheless, the
response of wages is typically not significant in most of the literature. Using individual-level
data, Basu and House (2016) find that wages of newly hired workers and the user cost of
labor respond strongly and pro-cyclically to MP innovations. The reason is that aggregate
data on wages and productivity might be subject to biases due to systematic changes in the
3There is a literature on the cyclical behavior of the labor share conditional on technology shocks such as
Choi and R´ıos-Rull (2009), R´ıos-Rull and Santaeula´lia-Llopis (2010) and Leo´n-Ledesma and Satchi (forthcoming).
However, our focus here is on the effects of MP innovations.
4It is worth pointing out that the difference between the responses of labor productivity and real wages in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Altig et al. (2011), do not necessarily reflect the responses of
the US labor share. This is because, as discussed below, real wages and productivity are constructed using
different price deflators. Also, we would be ignoring the adjustments to proprietors’ income, net taxes, and capital
depreciation typically used to construct labor share series. See Section 2 and Appendix A.
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composition of employed workers over the cycle. This composition bias that might affect
aggregate measures of the real wage and labor productivity cancels out when combining
them to construct the labor share measure.5 This argument reinforces the advantage of
using the labor share in aggregate empirical analyses. In our case, since we also find pro-
cyclical aggregate responses of real wages and labor productivity, the composition bias can
only reinforce our results (see section 2.1).
The relationship between the markup, the labor share, and their cyclicality is the focus
of, amongst many others, Bils (1987), Bils, Klenow, and Malin (2018), Gal´ı, Gertler, and
Lo´pez-Salido (2007), Hall (2012), Nekarda and Ramey (2013) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999).
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) studied extensively the cyclical behavior of real marginal
costs and price markups. They found a pro-cyclical marginal labor cost and show that the
implied counter-cyclicality of markups accounted for a substantial fraction of cyclical out-
put movements. Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2007) expand on the resulting literature
on counter-cyclical markups and present a theory-based measure of the gap between the
marginal product of labor and the household consumption and leisure trade off, the ‘la-
bor wedge’. They show how this variable corresponds to the reciprocal of the markup of
prices over ‘social’ marginal costs. Most of the variation of this wedge is associated with
counter-cyclical movements in the wage markup. The price markup shows, at best, a weak
contemporaneous correlation. More recently, Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014), also
find evidence of a greater importance of wage rigidities.
Karabarbounis (2014) also discusses the counter-factual requirement of NK models that,
in order to have a counter-cyclical markup, a pro-cyclical labor share is necessary. He
decomposes the labor wedge in two parts: a firm’s wedge and a household wedge. Starting
from the assumption that the firm’s wedge is a decreasing function of the labor share, and
that the labor share is counter-cyclical, he observes that the firm’s first-order condition that
the MPL equals the real wage needs to be augmented by a relatively smooth and pro-cyclical
wedge for this condition hold in the data. Our findings also cast doubts on this counter-
factual requirement of NK models.
Nekarda and Ramey (2013) discuss generalizations of the production function used in
NK models that decouple the price markup from the measured labor share in the data.
Using these theory generalizations as empirical proxies for the markup, they show that the
markup is pro-cyclical or a-cyclical in the US. They also show a pro-cyclical response of
the markup conditional on demand shocks. Their conclusions, like ours, cast doubts on the
standard transmission mechanism of NK models. Our approach differs from theirs because,
as mentioned above, we first obtain evidence from directly measurable labor shares and then
use NK models from which we derive the behavior of the labor share and its components
and analyze the coherence between their responses to a MP shock and that obtained in the
VARs. We make use of a wide variety of NK models where the relationship between the
labor share and the price markup breaks down. While Nekarda and Ramey (2013) conclude
that refocusing models around wage rigidity may resolve their empirical inconsistency, we
show that, even with wage and labor market rigidities, models are unable to reproduce the
joint behavior of the labor share and its components.
Bils, Klenow, and Malin (2018) revive the role of counter-cyclical markups and sticky
prices. They note that criticisms of the counter-cyclicality of the markup are based on
the observation that the gap between average hourly earnings and labor productivity is a-
cyclical. They argue that average hourly earnings may not reflect the true marginal cost of
labor to the firm. Hence, they look at the intra-temporal wedge for the self-employed and
the product market wedge from intermediate inputs. Their finding is that product market
5The labor share is defined as Sh = WH/Y = W/Y/H, where W are real wages, Y is output, and H is hours
worked.
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distortions are at least as important as labor market distortions in recent recessions.
Recently, Broer et al. (forthcoming) address the issue of MP transmission in a simple
version of the heterogeneous agent NK model. In their model, distributional effects of MP
shocks in a model with only price rigidity would imply no output response. Instead, with
wage rigidity, the response of labor supply disconnects from workers’ income leading to
output effects. They show that, with wage rigidity, profits become pro-cyclical. However,
the share of output accruing to profits (i.e. the markup) is still counter-cyclical as wage
rigidity can only affect its magnitude and persistence but not its sign.6 Thus, the problems
faced by these types of models in reproducing the dynamics of the labor share also persist
when we introduce distributional effects with heterogeneous agents.
There are several channels that can break the relationship between the labor share and
the inverse of the markup. As discussed in Nekarda and Ramey (2013), for instance, CES
production functions or the presence of fixed costs of production would imply that the labor
share differs from the inverse of the markup. Another simple way of breaking this relationship
is the cost channel of MP (see Ravenna and Walsh 2006). If firms need to borrow working
capital to pay for variable inputs in advance of production, changes in interest rates would
affect wage costs leading to a cost channel of MP. However, the inverse of the labor share and
the price markup are not equal in these models because nominal interest rates have a direct
effect on marginal costs. Hence, in the presence of working capital, there are two contrasting
forces: pro-cyclical markups and counter-cyclical interest rates. Another important channel
that breaks the relationship between markups and the labor share is search and matching
frictions in the labor market (see Trigari 2006). In these models, wages are determined by a
Nash bargaining process between firms and workers.
We show that it is possible to reproduce the observed response of the labor share to
a monetary policy shock but only with a strong degree of nominal wage stickiness. If we
allow the degree of wage stickiness to be stronger than price stickiness, in the presence of
perfectly competitive labor markets, real wages will respond counter-cyclically to a monetary
innovation and hence move the labor share in the right direction. This, however, comes to
the cost of generating a counter-cyclical response of wages that is at odds with the evidence.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 presents the data, and key results from the VAR
analysis. An extended set of results and robustness is provided in section B of the Online
Appendix accompanying the paper. Section 3 presents the quantitative analysis on medium
scale DSGE models using a three step approach. We conclude in Section 4.
2 The labor share and monetary policy: Empirics
The share of labor in total income can be measured directly from national accounts. Loosely
speaking, it represents the fraction of total income that is attributable to labor earnings.
Unlike markups, measuring it does not require any specification of the production side of the
economy. Its precise measurement is, however, complicated by issues associated with how
to impute certain categories of income to labor and/or to capital earnings. The existence of
self-employment income, the treatment of the government sector, the role of indirect taxes
and subsidies, household income accruing from owner occupied housing, and the treatment
of capital depreciation, are common problems highlighted in the literature, see e.g. Gollin
(2002), Gomme and Rupert (2004) and Muck, McAdam, and Growiec (2015). As in Gomme
and Rupert (2004) we consider the labor share in the non-financial corporate sector. Neither
proprietors’ income nor rental income are included in this sector accounts. We thus avoid the
issues of properly apportioning proprietors’ income to labor and capital or of accounting for
6In order to obtain their key result, they calibrate a very high value of wage stickiness that implies an almost
a-cyclical markup. It is straightforward to show, however, that no parameterization can turn the markup pro-
cyclical.
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labor income in the housing sector. Similarly, we consider the labor share in the domestic
corporate sector in Australia and we imputed mixed income in the same proportion as
unambiguous labor and capital income when computing the labor share in Canada. For the
Euro Area and the United Kingdom we define the labor share as compensation of employees
over nominal Gross Value Added at factor costs.7
Figure 1 plots the baseline quarterly labor share measures for all the countries under anal-
ysis. Low frequency fluctuations are visible across all countries, which is a well-established
fact. However, it is evident that labor shares have also moved systematically in the short
run. On average, we find that the labor share is counter-cyclical and tends to increase in
recessions. This is confirmed by looking at the contemporaneous correlation with output,
which is mostly negative, and with the policy rate, mostly positive except for the UK and
the Euro Area. Table 1 presents the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated correlation
between the labor share and HP filtered output and between the labor share and the short
term interest rate.
In these five major economies the labor share fluctuates over the business cycles possi-
bly in response to different types of shocks. The question is then, can an unexpected MP
accommodation or tightening modify the share of labor income? By looking at the uncon-
ditional correlation between the labor share and the policy rate little can be inferred. As
interest rates can vary for a variety of reasons, their co-movement could be the result of
the systematic response of MP to other shocks hitting the economy, e.g. financial shocks.
If we want to answer these questions, we need to impose more structure in order to iso-
late the changes in the labor share ascribed to an exogenous MP impulse. For this, we use
the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model which is a framework that has been extensively
used to study the dynamic transmission of exogenous policy variations to macroeconomic
aggregates. One of the advantages of VAR models is their extreme flexibility compared to
theoretical business cycle models. This flexibility makes VAR-based analysis less likely to be
distorted by incorrect specifications of the equilibrium conditions implied by the theoretical
model. Also, under mild conditions, VARs can be regarded as unrestricted representations of
micro-founded structural macroeconomic models. Thus, the dynamic transmission of mone-
tary shocks in the structural model can be mapped into the VAR impulse responses with a
minimal set of restrictions.
To this end, we explored various restrictions proposed in the literature. In particular,
we considered: 1) timing restrictions (Cholesky), where we assume that the macroeconomic
aggregates do not respond to the policy variable within the quarter; 2) ‘reasonable’ and
quantitatively loose (sign) restrictions, where we assume that a monetary tightening de-
presses the price level and monetary base growth; and, 3) only for the US, instrumental
variables restrictions, where we impose a correlation between the monetary policy shock in
the VAR and a narrative monetary series counterpart based on FOMC minutes (see Romer
and Romer (2004)) or between the VAR shock and the intra-day variation of the Federal
Fund rate in a narrow window around the monetary policy action (see Gurkaynak et al.
(2005), Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2017). For exposition
purposes, we only report the results that we obtain with timing restriction identification. In
section 2.2 we discuss briefly the findings of alternative identification schemes, whose results
can be consulted in the Appendix.
More formally, we assume that the joint co-movements of our key macroeconomic vari-
7In the Appendix, we describe in more detail the data construction. In particular, we consider seven different
proxies for the labor share in the US for the post WWII period. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides measures
of the labor share in the non-farm business and in the non-financial corporation sectors. Cooley and Prescott
(1995), Gomme and Rupert (2004) and Fernald (2014) offer alternative measurements, which we considered in the
empirical exercises in order to make our statements more sound. Being highly correlated, the different proxies do
not matter for the results of the paper. For the other countries, where available, we used similar approaches and
measurements.
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ables can be described by a VAR of order p which takes the following form:
yt = Φ0 + Φ1yt−1 + ...Φpyt−p + et et ∼ N(0,Σ),
where t is a vector of normal zero mean i.i.d. shocks with Σ = E(t
′
t). Φ0,Φ1, ...,Φp are
matrices of appropriate dimensions describing the dynamics of the system. yt is a vector
that contains the observable variables, which are the log of real GDP, the log of the GDP
deflator, the log of an index of commodity prices, log of the CPI, the log of the labor
share, short term interest rates, and M2 growth. The reduced form VAR is compatible with
several structural representations where reduced form residuals can be expressed as linear
combination of structural uncorrelated innovations, i.e.
et = Ωνt,
where ΩΩ′ = Σ and E(νtν ′t) = In. Our baseline strategy to retrieve the monetary policy
innovation from the rotation matrix, Ω, is to assume a recursive timing restriction on the
real variables of the VAR. The identification assumption is that a shock to the policy rate
only has an instantaneous effect on money growth. This implies that all the other variables
do not react contemporaneously to changes in the interest rate. This implies also that the
policy rate responds contemporaneously to all the macroeconomic shocks hitting prices, real
variables and shares.8 The sample spans used for each country VAR embrace the Great
Moderation period. Since we are interested in the relationship between the labor share
and monetary policy, we restrict the samples to periods where monetary policy was not
constrained by the effective lower bound. In particular we consider 1984:Q1-2007:Q4 for
the US, 1999:Q4-2011:Q3 for the EA, 1985:Q1-2009:Q4 for Australia, 1985:Q1-2011:Q1 for
Canada, and 1986:Q1-2008:Q1 for the UK. Lag selection is guided by the BIC criterion.9 All
the VARs presented in the paper were estimated using Bayesian methods with uninformative
priors.
Figure 2 reports the responses of all the variables to a MP shock (tightening) normalized
to a 1% increase in the short term interest rate. We report the median response from the
posterior distribution as well as the 68% confidence set. All responses are expressed in
percentage terms. First, we notice that the identified transmission reflects our priors about
the dynamic transmission of monetary policy: in response to an interest rate hike output
falls and prices decline slowly for all the countries considered. The persistence and the signs
of the responses of our key macroeconomic variables are in line with what found in other
studies (including the price puzzle). What is new is the response of the labor share. In every
country it is positive and statistically significant. Empirically, an unexpected MP tightening
increases the share of labor in total income. The increase in labor share also appears to be
persistent and does not vanish within a few quarters with the possible exception of the EA.
Furthermore, the response of the shares are also quantitatively relevant. Across all countries,
we observe that the magnitude of the increase in the labor share in percentage points is at
least half of the one observed for output and, in some cases, even bigger. For example, if we
look at the US, we observe that the median response of output after 10 quarters is almost
-1% while the increase in the labor sharer reaches a peak of 1.4% at the same horizon. For
the rest of the countries, instead, the labor share responses are about a half of the response
of output.
2.1 Dissecting the labor share response to a monetary policy shock
A counter-cyclical response of the labor share conditional on monetary policy shocks can
occur either because real wages are more counter-cyclical than labor productivity or because
8We checked whether ordering the labor share after the short term interest rate changes the results. It does
not.
9We use 3 lags for Australia, 2 lags for US, UK and Canada, and one lag for the EA.
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labor productivity is more pro-cyclical than real wages. The two scenarios have very different
implications for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and will prove to be crucial
in evaluating the performance of business cycle theories as we show in the next section.
Hence, here we focus on real wages and labor productivity. Furthermore, we look at output
and hours separately to understand the determinants of the behavior of labor productivity.
We express the labor share (Sh) as the ratio between real hourly compensation (W r),
deflated using CPI, and labor productivity (LP ) which is the ratio between real GDP,


















where Wn are nominal hourly wages, PCPI is the CPI, H is hours, Y n is nominal GDP and
P the GDP deflator. In most of the theory models, instead, W r and LP have, by construc-
tion, the same deflators and we need take this into account when comparing empirical and
theoretical IRFs.
We use the same recursive identification approach as before and we run a VAR under two
different information sets. The first experiment consists of the baseline VAR specification
where we substitute the labor share with (the log of) real wages and labor productivity.
In the second experiment, we substitute labor productivity with hours. For the US we
consider the non-financial corporate sector counterparts of GDP, GDP deflator, CPI, and
Labor Productivity.10 As discussed by Gomme and Rupert (2004), in this sector there are no
problems arising from the measurement of proprietors and rental income. The results using
data for the aggregate economy show the same picture. For the rest of the countries, however,
we do not have access to more granular data and consider the labor share components for
the whole economy.
Figure 3 plots the individual impulse responses to a monetary tightening for each of the
labor share components in the countries under analysis.11 The first thing to notice from
this figure is that the reduction in labor productivity is significant and persistent (second
column). The magnitude of its decline is always larger than the sum of the effect on real
wages and on the relative price. Hence, the labor share goes up. Regarding real wages, they
fall for the US, Australia, and Canada while their response is not significant for the EA and
the UK. The third column in the figure shows the response of the CPI relative to the GDP
deflator (PCPI/P ). The relative price does not seem to follow any clear pattern in most
countries with the exception of the US, where we observe a significant decline. The last two
columns of the figure show what the driving force behind the reduction in labor productivity
is that output declines more than hours.
The results from this decomposition show that the labor share falls because productivity
falls more than real wages do, and the fall in productivity is driven by a larger fall in output
than in hours worked. Real wages tend to fall on average, but the fall is not significant
in some countries. That is, the results show that the response of real wages is at least
non-positive.
We argued in the introduction that one of the advantages of using the labor share is that
the composition bias in the response of real wages and productivity is alleviated when one
takes their ratio as argued convincingly by Basu and House (2016). However, in this section
10The ordering is then: Real GDP, GDP deflator, price of commodities, CPI, real wages, labor productivity (or
hours), Federal Funds Rate and M2 growth. CPI in the non-financial corporate sector is constructed by from the
data on real and nominal hourly wages in this sector.
11To make sure the decomposition is consistent with the dynamics of the original variables, we used the impulse
responses of wages, productivity, output, and hours to construct the “implicit” impulse response of the labor share
and labor productivity. In all cases, the “implicit” impulse responses matched the ones obtained directly when we
introduce the labor share and labor productivity in the VAR. Also we used the response of the CPI and the GDP
deflator to compute the “implicit” impulse responses of P
CPI
P in the figures.
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we have used them separately to uncover the components of the response in the labor share.
It may be argued, then, that these results are compromised by reintroducing the composition
bias. It is then important to analyze whether, given our results, the composition bias may
invalidate our results.
In order to understand this, we simplify the argument in Basu and House (2016). We
abstract from entry and exit of new workers and matching quality, since these effects would
only reinforce our argument here. Define xt as our measure of aggregate labor productivity
or real hourly wages (LPt,W
r
t ). Now assume we can classify workers in a discreet grid of
N levels of “human capital” or skills from lowest to highest, j = 1, . . . , N . We implicitly
assume that wages/productivity increase with the level of human capital. Then, aggregate
productivity or wages are simply the weighted sum by level of human capital: xt =
∑
j xj,tαj,t









xj,tαj,t = xt +
∑
j
(xj,t − xt) (αj,t − αt) = µt + %t,
where xt and αt are the averages of wages/productivity and the shares of workers of differ-
ent levels of human capital respectively. This expression tells us that observed aggregate
wages or productivity can be decomposed into two components: the un-weighted average
wage/productivity of workers (µt), and the covariance between wages/productivity and the
share of workers by level of human capital (%t). The first term is the wage/productivity of
the “representative” worker. The second term tells us about the structure of the labor force:
whether shares are increasing or decreasing in productivity (the skill-composition). Changes
in this term would precisely be related to the composition bias: they tell us whether dur-
ing booms or recessions the composition of the labor force changes. For instance, if during
booms the share of high productivity workers decreases, then the covariance would fall.
Our interest is in the cyclical evolution of µt conditional on a MP tightening, since this
is the direct correspondence between data and models in a large class of representative
agent DSGEs. To settle notation, call f(., t)MP the impulse response function (IRF) over
t = 1, . . . , T of any variable to a MP tightening. Since the IRF of two additive variables
is also additive, we have that: f(xt, t)MP = f(µt, t)MP + f(%t, t)MP ∀t. Now suppose, for
simplicity, that the effect of a MP shock on aggregate wages/productivity is zero at all
horizons of the IRF. This implies that: f(µt, t)MP = −f(%t, t)MP . Now, suppose we know
that, in an expansion, the share of low skilled workers increases and it falls in a recession as
discussed in Basu and House (2016). Thus, the change in this covariance is negative during
an expansion. Basu and House (2016) also show that, conditional on a MP shock, the
composition bias changes: the covariance increases (falls) with a MP tightening (loosening).
It immediately follows then that, if the aggregate response is zero, then the “representative
worker” response must be negative with a MP tightening.
Our findings above show that the response of aggregate labor productivity is negative and
aggregate real wages respond at least non-positively (and negatively in most cases). From
the above argument, the response of the representative agent wage/productivity would then
be negative. That is, it will be more negative than the one obtained using aggregate data. If
there is a composition bias and that bias is counter-cyclical, at least we know that the sign
of the response of real wages and productivity is negative.12
As a second cross-check of this argument, we use data on composition bias corrected
12Note that this is not to say that, from our VAR results, we know the value of this effect, but at least we
do know its sign. Had we found a positive response of wages and productivity, then the true sign would be
indeterminate unless we know the exact magnitude of the composition bias. Also, if the composition bias in wages
and productivity cancels out when constructing the labor share, both the sign and value of this response would be
identified.
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measures of wages constructed by Haefke, Sonntag, and Van-Rens (2013) for the US. The
results verify that the different measures of composition bias corrected wages are indeed
more procyclical in response to a MP shock than the ones obtained using aggregate wages.13
2.2 Robustness
We carried out a number of experiments to check whether the empirical results are robust
to alternative specifications. The key message here is that we find that the rise in the labor
share following a MP tightening is a remarkably robust fact. We briefly summarize the
experiments here. Details on all of them can be consulted in section B of the Appendix.
• For the US, Australia, and Canada, we use multiple measures of the labor share. All
proxies constructed generate similar impulse responses profiles.
• For the US, we studied different subsamples and a larger information set (where we
included also the main components of aggregate expenditure). Basu and House (2016)
and Ramey (2016) show that using samples with more recent data the impulse response
functions change substantially relative to the ones obtained in Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005), who use a less recent time span. Ramey (2016) concludes that the
most likely reason for the breakdown in the later sample is simply that we can no longer
identify MP shocks well. Thus, we estimate the VAR with the baseline information
set for the 1965:Q1-1995Q3 sample and the 1965:Q1 until 2007:Q4 sample. Subsample
estimates and larger information sets do not alter out main empirical finding.
• We considered an alternative identification scheme based on sign restrictions to identify
MP shocks (see Uhlig (2005)). We postulate that a monetary policy shock
– increased the short term nominal interest rate at t = 0, 1, 2
– decreased prices, i.e. the GDP deflator and CPI at t = 0, 1, 2
– induced a contraction in M2 at t = 0, 1, 2
This identification scheme imposes a weaker restrictions relative to the recursive iden-
tification. Implicit is the idea that a MP tightening should at least raise interest rate,
and depress the price level and monetary aggregates for at least three quarters. While
one could impose more restrictions, these ones are uncontroversial and common to a
wide variety of structural models with different types of frictions. We generate can-
didate draws for the rotation matrix satisfying these restrictions using the algorithm
developed in Rubio-Ramı´rez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010). Figure 4 plots the results
for all the countries. While there are quantitative differences between this and the
Cholesky identification restrictions, the qualitative results are unchanged. That is, af-
ter a MP contraction, the labor share increases for all countries (and for all labor share
proxies). It is important to note that, for all the countries except the EA, we find that
the impact response of output is non-negative, which is the same result obtained by
Uhlig (2005) for the US.
• An alternative identification scheme that the VAR literature has proposed is the ex-
ternal/instrumental variable approach as pioneered by Stock and Watson (2012) and
by Mertens and Ravn (2013). The basic idea of the structural VAR with external
instrument is that the monetary policy shock in the structural VAR is identified as
the predicted value in the population regression of the instrument on the reduced form
VAR residuals. For this result to hold, the instrument needs to be valid; that is, it
needs to be relevant (correlated with the unobserved monetary policy shock of the
VAR) and exogenous (uncorrelated with the other shocks). This two stage regression
13Details available in section D of the Appendix.
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allows to recover the the first column of the rotation matrix Ω, and thus to recover im-
pulse responses and transmission mechanism. More formally, let mt be the time series
proxy for the unobserved monetary policy shock. Assume, without loss of generality,
that the proxy is linked to the first shock as follows:
E(νtmt) = [ρ, 0, ..., 0]
′,






Assuming that the first reduced form shock is related to the observed proxy, we can
partition the two sets of relationship and obtain:
E(e2,tmt)E(e1,tmt)
−1 = Ω−111 Ω2:N,1,
where the second equation can be estimated using the sample analog since mt is ob-
servable, et is observable conditional on Φ and Σ, and they are both stationary. This
restriction coupled with the fact that ΩΩ′ = Σ gives rise to a set of equations that, up
to a sign normalization, uniquely pin down the first column of the rotation matrix (see
Mertens and Ravn (2013) for more details).
Our econometric approach works as follows. We draw the reduced-form VAR parameter
values from the posterior distribution assuming a flat prior as in the previous sections.
We then compute the implied reduced-form VAR residuals associated to this draw. We
then isolate the variation in the reduced-form residual of the policy indicator that is
attributable to the proxy. We then regress the remaining reduced-form VAR residuals
on the fitted value of the first regression. This two stage regression allows us to recover
the first column of the rotation matrix, and thus to recover impulse responses and
transmission mechanism of the monetary policy surprises. We repeat this procedure
1,000 times and compute the 68% high probability density sets.
For the US we use five different proxies or instruments for monetary policy surprises.14
The first instrument we use is the Romer and Romer (2004) narrative measure of mon-
etary policy. The second instrument is the estimated monetary policy innovations in
the Smets and Wouters (2007) model and spans the period 1959q1-2004q4. The third
instrument is the “target” factor of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), which mea-
sures surprise changes in the target Federal Funds Rate (quarterly sums of daily data,
1990Q1-2004Q4). The fourth instrument is the Gertler and Karadi (2015) measure of
monetary policy surprises and spans the period 1991q1 - 2012q4. It is constructed as the
surprise of the current Federal Funds Rate within a 30 minutes window of the FOMC
announcement. The final instrument is constructed in Miranda-Agrippino (2016) as the
component in market-based monetary surprises that is orthogonal to the central bank’s
forecasts about the current and future economic outlook (see also Miranda-Agrippino
and Ricco (2017)).15 Figure 5 reports the dynamic transmission of MP surprises to
the US labor share and other macroeconomic aggregates. Our conclusions about the
impact of MP shocks is unaffected: after a MP tightening, the labor share consistently
increases. This result is, again, robust to the labor share measure used.
14We lack good instruments for other countries. For the Euro Area, Jardet and Monks (2014) constructed similar
high frequency proxies starting from the 2002. Given the short sample we cannot use them here. For the UK
Cloyne and Hu¨rtgen (2016) developed a narrative measure while Miranda-Agrippino (2016) and Gerko and Rey
(2017) obtain high frequency ones for UK and US. Although we experimented with these three measures for the
UK, we were unable to recover innovations that resembled a MP shock in terms of the behavior of output and
inflation. This may well be due to the fact that we focus on quarterly frequencies.
15Romer and Romer (2004) updated series are taken from Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015). We borrow the
second and third instrument from the database of Stock and Watson (2012).
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• The results on the aggregate labor share response raise the question whether the ob-
served response is due to changes in the composition of output from sectors with low to
sectors with high labor shares rather than a change in the labor share within sectors.
For this reason, we provide sectoral evidence on the response of the labor share. We
carry out this analysis for the US economy using both the NBER-CES productivity
database for 436 US manufacturing sectors as well as the Klems database for 30 sectors
including agriculture, manufacturing, and services. For reasons of space, we present
this analysis in supplementary Appendix C. The results confirm a similar pattern to
that obtained with aggregate data. I.e., at the sectoral level, the labor share increases
after a contractionary MP shock.
3 The labor share and monetary policy: Theory
We now tackle our second question: are models of economic fluctuations widely used for
monetary policy analysis able to jointly match the response of the labor share, real wages,
and productivity?
Intuitively, it is well know that in standard NK models the labor share is equivalent
to the inverse of the price markup (Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2007), Nekarda and
Ramey (2013)). Rearranging the linear version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve as in





where θt represents real marginal costs (inverse of the price markup), pit is inflation, and λ
is the slope. From this expression, it is clear that a temporary decline in inflation (because
of tighter monetary policy, for example) implies a decline in marginal costs (labor share)
and an increase in the markup. This one to one relationship is independent of the presence
factor adjustment costs, nominal wage rigidities, or financial frictions16 and it is true in an
economy with and without capital accumulation provided that the production function is
either Cobb-Douglas or linear in labor.
Several mechanisms commonly introduced in DSGE models can alter the relationship be-
tween the labor share and the markup. For instance, generalising the production function to
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) family, as in Cantore et al. (2014), introduces
a wedge between these two variables that depends on labor productivity and the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution. The cost channel of monetary policy (see Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) and Surico (2008)) introduces a direct effect of the interest rate on the marginal costs
since firms need to borrow in order to pay in advance all or part of their labor input costs. In
this setup, the markup can indeed become pro-cyclical and help generate a counter-cyclical
response of the labor share. However, this cost channel also introduces a direct effect of
the interest rate on the labor share which works in the opposite direction. Another way to
introduce a wedge between the labor share and the markup is by relaxing the assumption of
equality between the average and marginal wage (Bils (1987), Nekarda and Ramey (2013)).
This is usually implemented through the introduction of fixed costs in production. Finally,
relaxing the assumption of competitive labor markets and assuming search and matching
(Gal´ı (2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016)) implies that the real wage is
related to the bargaining power of workers. In this setting, wages do not move anymore only
proportionally to the markup and labor productivity.17
Each of the channels described above could, in principle, help a New-Keynesian model
match the impulse responses of interest. State of the art medium scale DSGE models widely
16In the form of a wedge between the real interest rate and return to capital.
17Supplementary Appendix E provides a detailed discussion of each of these theoretical channels that can separate
the labor share from the inverse of the markup.
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used to study the quantitative consequences of monetary policy commonly contain a com-
bination of these channels. Hence, we proceed by selecting families of DSGE models that
include these ingredients plus the usual nominal and real rigidities present in standard NK
models and compare them against the SVAR evidence from the previous section.
We start from the benchmark DSGE model developed in the seminal paper by CEE. This
is a medium scale model that includes price and wage rigidities, variable capital utilization,
habit formation in consumption, investment adjustment costs, and indexation in both prices
and wages.18 We label this model NK. The second model extends NK by generalizing the
production function to a CES as in Cantore et al. (2015). We label this model NK CES. We
then consider the role of working capital and hence the cost channel of monetary policy. We
analyzed a version of the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) model with working
capital. However, because this channel is amplified when there are firm networks and the
working capital channel extends to all inputs in production, we used the model by Phaneuf,
Sims, and Victor (2018) which we label NK WKN.19 Finally, we consider a medium scale
DSGE model with labor market frictions and alternate offer bargaining developed by Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016) (labeled NK SM). The last two models abstract
from price and wage indexation usually included to match real wage and inflation inertia
but that have been heavily criticised in the literature due to their lack of microfounda-
tions. Moreover NK SM also abstracts from sticky wages and endogenously generates wage
inertia.20
In order to ensure comparability, we assume the same Taylor type rule for monetary
policy in each of this models:
rt = ρ
rrt−1 + (1− ρr)[ρpipit + ρyyt] + εrt (3)
where rt is the interest rate set by the monetary authority, yt is real output, pit is inflation, ε
r
is the monetary policy shock and variables are defined in deviations from their steady state
values. ρr is the degree of interest rate smoothness while ρpi and ρy represent the magnitude
of the response of the interest rate to deviations of inflation and output respectively.
Moreover, we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016) and assume that, in
each model, the monetary policy shock is not in the current (period t) information set of
agents. This ensures that the timing assumptions implicit in the SVAR impulse responses
identified using Cholesky decomposition are comparable with the information set of the
DSGE models.
The response of the labor share in these medium scale models will depend, by construc-
tion, on the specific parameterization chosen. Given the size of these models, it is not possible
to derive analytical expressions that would allow us to discern whether the model is able to
match the responses of the labor share and its components. For this reason, we now turn to
a systematic numerical quantitative analysis. We do this using a three step approach which
we describe below.
3.1 Quantitative analysis: missing the link
Our objective here is to assess quantitatively the ability of the models discussed above to
replicate the empirical responses of the labor share and its components to a monetary policy
18This model is essentially equivalent to the Smets and Wouters (2007) model abstracting from growth.
19Note that this model has more chances of producing the desired response of the labor share. With the
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) model augmented with working capital only, results obviously do not
change our conclusions.
20For robustness, we also checked: all the models analyzed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016), a
model with right to manage as in Christoffel and Kuester (2008), and a sticky information model as in Mankiw
and Reis (2007). Results are available upon request.
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shock. The assessment is negative, as we do find a mismatch between the predictions of the
VAR model and the predictions of New Keynesian models with various types of frictions.
We arrive to this conclusion in three steps. We first ask whether there are combination
of model frictions that can, at least a priori, replicate the response of the labor share and
its components. Second, we single out the frictions that are important to generate those
responses. Finally, we ask the model to replicate as close as possible the SVAR impulse
response functions of our key macroeconomic variables, which include both real and nominal
quantities and the share of labor.21 While the structural models do a decent job in matching
the dynamic propagation of inflation and real quantities, they do not cope well in replicating
the propagation of the labor share and its components.
3.1.1 Are New Keynesian models able to replicate the empirical findings?
Only in very particular situations we can use analytical mappings between model structural
parameters and the impulse response patterns of models. For most models, these linkages are
blurred by the non linear relationships between the structural and the reduced form solution.
However, Montecarlo techniques allow us to assess the likelihood of a model replicating
certain moments of interest. As explained by Canova (1995), Lancaster (2004) and Geweke
(2005), prior sensitivity analysis (PSA) is a powerful tool to shed light on complicated objects
that depend on both the joint prior distribution of parameters and the model specification.
By generating a random sample from the prior distributions, one can compute the reduced
form solution and the model-implied statistics of interest, e.g. impulse responses. Many
replicas of the latter generates an empirical distribution of the model- and prior-implied
statistics of interest.22 In other words, we can assess the likelihood that the model generates
a set of sign patterns that are consistent with those observed in the data conditional on the
model and the specification of priors.
To this end, we attach uniform prior distributions to the parameters of the models pre-
sented above. Table 2 shows the calibration of parameters held fixed while table 3 shows
the bounds of the uniform distributions we attach to all the other parameters.23 Basically,
we allow for any economically meaningful value of the parameters, even for extreme values
such as full price flexibility.24 We then generate a random sample from the prior distri-
butions, compute the reduced form solution, and the model-implied impulse responses of
interest. We repeat this many times and generate an empirical distribution of the model-
and prior-implied impulse responses.
Table 4 summarizes the numerical analysis for each of the models. Numbers in the table
represents the percentage of the prior support that matches all the restrictions imposed on
the impulse response functions. We proceed in steps and first impose only the restriction
that the impulse response of the labor share needs to be positive from quarters two to five
inclusive and then add the same restriction, with opposite sign, to the real wage and labor
21A common concern when comparing IRFs of SVARs and of structural models is that SVARs may not be able
to identify correctly DSGE model shocks (see Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005)). For this reason, in the spirit of
the Sims-Cogley-Nason approach, we tested whether the SVARs were capable of retrieving the ‘true’ transmission
of the labor share using simulated data from the structural models. Overall, the SVAR captures very precisely the
‘true’ IRFs. Only for the NK model, the persistence of the output and labor share responses are misrepresented
to an extent in the SVAR, but they have similar signs and shapes. The results are presented in supplementary
Appendix F.
22These techniques have been used to compute the prior sensitivity of fiscal multipliers implied by different
DSGE models, see Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2015) and Fe´ve and Sahuc (2014).
23For NK SM model all the parameters not shown in table 2 are calibrated as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Trabandt (2016).
24The only exception to this is the share of intermediate goods in production in model NK WKN which has a
support up to 0.7. This is due to the fact that, beyond this value, the model does not have a stable solution.
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productivity. We repeat the exercise by imposing the same restrictions from quarters five to
eight.25
Looking at the second column we see that each model has a non-negligible portion of the
parameter space able to reproduce the sign of the labor share from quarter two to five. Yet,
for some models, this probability is quite low. This percentage increases when looking at
restrictions over quarters five to eight. However, notice that the probability of replicating
the full profile, i.e. from quarter two to eight, is the product of these two percentages.
As discussed in section 2.4, the labor share can increase because real wages increase more
than labor productivity or because labor productivity decreases more than real wages. Our
empirical analysis suggests that the latter is the case. When we impose restrictions on wages
and labor productivity, the probability of replicating the full array of sign patterns drops
significantly, below 10% (15%) at short (medium) horizons (columns 3 and 5). As it will
become clearer in the next section, the friction in the model that allows us to match the
labor share behavior is the degree of wage stickiness relative to price stickiness. However,
this comes at the cost of mismatching the response of real wages.
In any case, the results show that there exist a non zero percentage of the parameter
space that is able to match the sign of the impulse responses of the labor share and its
components.
3.1.2 What are the frictions that matter?
In order to understand the relative importance of each specific friction in driving the above
results we now turn to our second step: finding the parameters that are more important to
generate the response patterns in each model. This question is more subtle compared to the
one above because it requires an inverse mapping. Montecarlo filtering (MCF) techniques
offer a statistical framework to tackle this issue. As described in Ratto (2008), MCF tech-
niques are computational tools that allow us to recover, in a nonlinear model, the critical
inputs that generate a particular model output. In our context, for example, we would be in-
terested in the parameters of a model that are more important to drive a positive (negative)
movement of the labor share (wages/labor productivity) in response to a contractionary MP
shock.
The literature has mainly focused on sensitivity exercises on calibrated parameters where
the model objects of interest are computed by varying one parameter at a time. The MCF
has clear advantages over calibration sensitivity exercises. First, unlike sensitivity calibration
exercises, all parameters move simultaneously. Second, the Smirnoff test offers, implicitly,
a statistical ranking of parameters from the most to the least influential. Finally, it unveils
important relationships among parameters.26
Table 5 summarizes the results of this stage and highlights parameters that have a p–
value of the Smirnov statistic lower than the critical value of 0.001 for each model over the
same horizons of table 4.27 Check marks in black identify parameters driving the restrictions
over quarters two to five while red check marks identify the ones responsible over quarters
five to eight. Parameters driving the restrictions over both horizons have a check mark in
red and underlined. Few regularities emerge from this table. First of all, as expected, both
price and wage stickiness are identified as crucial in all models except in NK SM where wage
inertia is endogenized via labor market frictions generated by the alternate offer bargaining.
In particular, in frictionless labor market models, positive responses of the labor share
to a MP shock arise typically when there is substantial wage rigidity and when wages are
25Note that these restrictions are quite favorable to the models because we only use signs and not specific
magnitudes. Had we used reasonable magnitudes derived from the SVAR results, the outcomes would imply lower
likelihoods.
26Details in supplementary Appendix G.
27Detailed results by model are presented in supplementary Appendix G.
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less flexible than prices. The left panels of Figure 6 report the wage stickiness Cumulative
Density Functions (CDF) in various models when the the labor share IRFs are positive for
2-5 quarters or when they are not. Random draws of the wage stickiness parameter are split
into those that generate a positive response of labor share (in blue) and those that do not
(in red). For each of these two subsets, the empirical CDF is computed. As it stands out,
the two distributions are different. In particular, the support of the blue CDF is between
0.2 and 1 with most of the probability mass located to the right of 0.8. This indicates that
we need a lot of wage stickiness in order to generate a positive response of the labor share
to a monetary policy shock.
Yet, this might not be enough. We also need prices to be more flexible than wages. This
can be seen in the right panels of figure 6, where we plot the combination of random draws
from price and wage stickiness that do (not) verify the labor share IRF in blue (red). In
the northeast corner of the plot, where both prices and wages are rigid, the response of the
labor share to MP shocks tends to be negative (more red dots). As we move towards the
northeast corner (more flexible prices), the likelihood of generating a positive response of
the labor share to a monetary policy shock increases.
In sum, price and wage stickiness parameters are crucial for standard NK models without
labor market rigidities to match the dynamics of the labor share. In the presence of very
sticky nominal wages and relatively more flexible prices, following a monetary tightening,
the real wage increases because prices will decline more than nominal wages. This, in turn,
will lead to an expansion of labor income relative to total income. Hence, the labor share
goes up but for the ‘wrong’ reasons, i.e. real wages increase.
There are a number of other parameters that turn out to statistically matter. The price
markup parameter seems to be relevant in all models except NK CES over both horizons.
This highlights the importance of fixed costs in production: fixed costs are calibrated to
ensure zero entry in steady state and hence their value is directly related to the the price
markup parameter. Also, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the
NK CES model is identified as an important parameter in driving the restriction in the first
few quarters. The working capital fraction for labor inputs, the curvature of the investment
adjustment costs function, and few parameters related to labor market frictions in NK SM
are also key. Other relevant parameters identified are habits in consumption and the interest
rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule. These do not always show up as crucial in all
models. However, we adopt the conservative approach that, if any of the parameters has a
significant Smirnov statistic in at least one of the models, it will be estimated in step 3 for all
the models in which that parameter is present. The wage and price indexation parameters
are also estimated as they appeared to be relevant in versions of the working capital model
without firm networking.
In summary, all the channels we had identified as relevant for breaking the relationships
between the labor share and the price markup show up in the MCF analysis. The relative
importance of each of these frictions or mechanisms is crucial also for the transmission of
shocks to variables other than the labor share and its components. This will be important
for next section when we estimate the models to replicate the empirical IRFs.
3.1.3 Can we replicate the VAR evidence?
In the previous two steps, we have identified the portion of the parameter space and the
parameters responsible for generating IRFs patterns qualitatively similar to the ones we
identify in the SVAR analysis. The final question is then: are any of these models able
to quantitatively match the empirical response of the labor share and other relevant macro
variables to a MP shock? The answer to this question is not trivial. Since we want to
minimize the distance between model and SVAR IRFs for several variables, it may be the
case that models turn out to be well equipped to match some variables but not others.
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The answer is also crucial to understand whether the transmission channels of MP shocks
present in these models are adequate. To do so, we estimate the model parameters using the
Bayesian IRF matching approach advocated in Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010)
and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016).
A few things are worth emphasising here. First, we extend our baseline Cholesky spec-
ification by adding the relative price of investment, capacity utilization, real consumption,
and investment to the set of observables since we want to assess the ability of the model to
reproduce the responses of important macro variables. Second, we do not enter real variables
and price indices in levels as we do in section 2 because here we need to match the IRFs from
stationary models. Moreover, the price level cannot be pinned down in the structural models
and hence we have to match inflation instead. Third, for reasons of collinearity with the la-
bor share, we cannot include hours, real wage, and labor productivity as in Altig et al. (2011)
or Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010). Hence, the information set of the estimated
SVAR for IRF matching is the following: ∆ log of the relative price of investment, ∆ log of
Real GDP, ∆ log of GDP deflator, ∆ log of price of commodities, ∆ log of CPI, capacity
utilization, ∆ log of consumption, ∆ log of investment, log of the labor share, Federal Funds
Rate, ∆ M2. Data on capacity utilization and relative price of investment come from Altig
et al. (2011). Since we are interested only in the dynamic transmission of monetary policy
shocks, we do not specify a trending process for the real variables in the structural model,
e.g. a permanent neutral technology shock. The latter generates co-integrating relationships
among output, investment, and consumption, which can be accounted for in the SVAR by
considering the (nominal) great ratios of consumption and and investment to output (as in
Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) and Altig et al. (2011)). As our model abstracts
from permanent shocks, we are not constrained to impose any co-integration relationship
and we treat real variables in growth rates (or level) without imposing any structure on
their long run relationships. As monetary policy shocks are orthogonal to permanent tech-
nological shifts, including real variables in growth rates or using their nominal great ratios
in the empirical model does not make a difference for the dynamic transmission of mone-
tary policy shocks.28 Finally, because the VAR contains a larger set of 11 variables, and
hence parameters, we increase the sample period and use all the available data. Since some
of the observables are not available for other countries, we restrict this analysis to the US
economy for the sample period 1959Q2 to 2008Q4.29 With this specification, we estimate a
Bayesian SVAR with 2 lags and identify a MP shock following the same Cholesky recursive
identification approach as before where the Federal Funds Rate is ordered just before money
growth.30
We then estimate each DSGE model by choosing the values of the selected parameters
that minimize a measure of the distance between the SVAR impulse responses and the DSGE
model-based ones. As mentioned above, we use the Bayesian Impulse Responses matching
approach developed in Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) to impose economically
meaningful priors on the structural parameters. As we follow closely Christiano, Trabandt,
and Walentin (2010) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016), we refer the readers
to those sources for details on the minimum distance estimator used. The structural models
are estimated by matching the IRFs of the following variables: output, inflation, federal
funds rates, consumption, investment, capacity utilization, and the labor share.
Each model parameter space is partitioned into two subsets. One comprises calibrated
parameters that are held fixed in estimation and the other parameters estimated to minimize
the distance between the SVAR and DSGE models IRFs. Calibrated parameters in this
28This is actually what we find using either SVAR specification. The results following exactly the same specifi-
cation as in Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) and Altig et al. (2011) are available upon request.
29It is important to note that we carried out several sensitivity tests with this specification of the VAR and, as
before, the positive response of the labor share to a MP contraction remains robust.
30For details see Appendix H.
17
exercise are the same as in table 2.31 Table 6 summarizes the priors used in estimation. We
use a Beta distributions for probabilities, habits, interest rate smoothness, working capital
fractions, intermediate shares in production, and matching function share of unemployment.
A Gamma distribution is used for investment adjustment costs, capital utilization, price
markup, Taylor rule responses to inflation and output, and hiring and search costs. Finally,
a Normal distribution is used for the elasticity of capital-labor substitution.32 All priors are
centred around values chosen in line with the literature on Bayesian estimation of DSGE
models.
In Table 7 we report the parameters estimates and 95% confidence intervals. A few
regularities emerge from this table. First, most of the parameter estimates are similar across
models. This is true for habits in consumption, price markup in steady state33 and Taylor
rule coefficients. Variable capital utilization changes substantially across models. Calvo price
parameters show substantially more stickiness in models without the working capital channel.
What appears to be a common pattern is the higher relative stickiness of wages compared to
prices that the estimation produces across all models with Calvo sticky wages. Moreover, all
except the NK WKN model present an implausibly high degree of wage stickiness in order
to minimize the distance with the SVAR and the DSGE IRFs. It is also interesting to note
that the fraction of working capital is estimated to be large in the NK WKN model and that,
in the model with non competitive labor markets, we estimate a high replacement ratio of
60%.
Figure 7 plots the resulting IRFs. It reports, in grey, the 68% confidence bands and
in black the median response from the SVAR while the IRFs from each estimated model
are presented with different colors. All the models are able to reproduce fairly well the
responses of real variables with the possible exception of investment in the first two quarters.
Moreover, inflation persistence is underestimated in all models. What is striking, however, is
the inability all models to reproduce the response of the labor share and capacity utilization,
with the two clearly linked via the effect of MP shocks on labor productivity.34 Only NK CES
and NK WKN are able to produce a small positive response of the labor share after a couple
of quarters following the MP tightening. However, the magnitude of the response and the
profile of the IRF is far off the ones estimated in the SVAR.
The results in figure 7 are in line with the intuitive discussion of the mechanisms present
in these DSGE models. Although these models, with the exception of NK, are able to split
the dynamics of the labor share and marginal costs, these mechanisms are not well equipped
to generate a dynamic response that is consistent with the one obtained in the SVAR analysis.
From the PSA analysis we know that there is a sub-set of the parameters’ space in these
models that can reproduce qualitatively the positive response of the labor share to a MP
tightening. However, this subset is not selected when the whole model is estimated to match
the IRFs of several variables of interest. In other words, models that can do a reasonable
job at reproducing the dynamic responses of real variables cannot simultaneously match the
dynamics of the labor share.35 This fact sheds doubts on the transmission mechanism of MP
in these models. Furthermore, in estimated DSGE models for policy analysis, it is common
31With the addition of the the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the wage markup that, where
applicable, are now calibrated to value equal 1 and 1.2 respectively. Both parameters were not flagged up as
relevant in the MCF analysis.
32Note that the MP shock standard deviation prior is centred around the estimated standard deviation value in
the SVAR.
33Which determines the proportion of fixed costs in production.
34The associated responses of real wages and labor productivity in each model are not reported here but are in
line with the evidence presented in section 2.1.
35To confirm this, we also estimated the DSGE models by matching only the labor share and Fed Funds rate.
In this case, most models can obviously match the labor share, but the response of real variables and inflation is
grossly out of line with the data. See figure I1 in the supplementary Appendix.
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practice to proxy marginal costs with the labor share as an observable (see, for instance, Del
Negro et al. (2013)). However, if we take the robust evidence presented in Section 2 at face
value, then the transmission mechanism assumed with this practice is at odds with the data
behavior which can have important consequences for the estimates of the model parameters.
4 Conclusions
A key transmission channel of monetary policy shocks in New Keynesian (NK) models works
through the effect of monetary policy (MP) shocks on markups that have direct implications
for the dynamics of the labor share. In its simplest version, the NK model implies that,
after a monetary policy shock, markups increase and the labor share falls. The direct link
between the markup and the labor share, however, breaks down in a variety of models that
introduce different production functions, fixed costs, labor market frictions, and/or a cost
channel of monetary policy. Despite its importance, there is no systematic evidence on the
effect of monetary policy shocks on the labor share. We fill this gap and provide the first
cross-country empirical analysis on the effects of monetary policy on the labor share and its
components (the real wage and labor productivity) for a set of five economies: the US, the
Euro Area, UK, Australia and Canada.
Using state of the art VAR identification techniques our evidence shows that, cyclically,
a monetary policy tightening (easing) increased (decreased) the labor share and decreased
(increased) real wages, and labor productivity during the Great Moderation period for all
countries under study. These facts are robust across time periods, shock identification meth-
ods, information sets, and measures of the labor share.
We then analyze the ability of widely used models for monetary policy analysis to re-
produce these important stylized facts. Unlike the previous related literature that focuses
on the dynamics of the markup, our approach is to obtain measures of the labor share and
its components from models and analyze whether their response to monetary policy shocks
is consistent with the one observed in the data. We analyze standard NK DSGE models
and versions of this model augmented with a working capital channel, different production
functions, and with search and matching frictions. Because of the impossibility of obtain-
ing analytical results, we take a numerical approach that consists of three steps. We first
analyze whether there is a subset of the parameter space of the models that is qualitatively
consistent with the responses obtained in the SVAR. We then select the subset of parameters
that are important drivers of the response of the labor share and its components. Finally,
we estimate these parameters in the different models using impulse response matching and
compare the response of the labor share to an MP shock in the estimated DSGEs with that
obtained in the SVAR.
We show that, in the models considered, there is a puzzling mismatch between data and
theory which is not just a feature of simple setups such as the basic NK model but carries
over in richer set ups. From steps one and two of our numerical analysis, we show that it
is possible to obtain positive labor share responses to a monetary policy contraction when
the degree of wage stickiness is higher than price stickiness. But this comes at the cost
of obtaining counter-factual (countercyclical) responses of real wages. I.e., the labor share
moves in the “right direction for the wrong reasons”. When we estimate the models using
impulse response matching, we show that the models do a reasonable job at matching the
response of a set of real variables but they cannot match the response of the labor share.
That is, models that can do well at reproducing the dynamic responses of real variables
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Country Sample Output Policy Rate
US 1955Q1-2015Q3 [-0.29 , 0.04] [0.28 , 0.60]
EA 1999Q1-2014Q4 [-0.91 , -0.37] [-0.76 , -0.28]
UK 1971Q1-2016Q1 [-0.41 , 0.11] [-0.52 , 0.08]
AUS 1959Q3-2013Q4 [-0.23 , 0.12] [0.49 , 0.70]
CAN 1981Q2-2013Q4 [-0.56 , -0.07] [0.45 , 0.72]
Table 1: Correlation with HP filtered Output and Policy rate. GMM 95 % Confidence Intervals
and sample coverage.
Description NK NK CES NK WKN NK SM
Discount Factor 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Capital depreciation 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
Steady State Hours 0.330 0.330 0.33 -
Unemployment rate - - - 5.5%
Steady State Labor Share 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.670
Fixed cost in production calibrated to ensure 0 profits in steady state
Relative Risk Aversion 1 1 1 1
Table 2: Calibration of parameters held constant in PSA and MCF.
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Description NK NK CES NK WKN NK SM
Inverse of Frish Elasticity of Labor Supply U [1, 10] - U [1, 10] U [1, 10]
Investment adjustment costs U [1, 10]
Habits in Consumption U [0, 1]
Variable Capital Utilization U [0, 1]
Calvo price stickiness U [0, 1]
Calvo wage stickiness U [0, 1] U [0, 1] U [0, 1] -
price markup U [1, 1.2]
wage markup U [1, 1.2] U [1, 1.2] U [1, 1.2] -
Interest rate smoothing U [0, 1]
Taylor rule response to inflation U [1.01, 5]
Taylor rule response to output U [0, 1]
Price Indexation U [0, 1] U [0, 1] - -
Wage Indexation U [0, 1] U [0, 1] - -
K/L elasticity of substitution - U [0.01, 5] - -
working capital fraction (labor) - - U [0, 1] U [0, 1]
Intermediate inputs share in production - - U [0, 1] -
working capital fraction (capital) - - U [0, 1] -
working capital fraction (intermediate inputs) - - U [0, 0.7] -
technology diffusion - - - U [0, 1]
prob. of barg. session determination - - - U [0, 1]
replacement ratio - - - U [0, 1]
hiring fixed cost relative to output % - - - U [0, 2]
search cost relative to output % - - - U [0, 2]
matching function share of unemployment - - - U [0, 1]
job survival rate - - - U [0, 1]
vacancy filling rate - - - U [0, 1]
Table 3: Uniform Distribution bounds for PSA and MCF.
Restrictions
2:5 quarters 5:8 quarters
Model ls (+) ls (+); lp (-); w (-) ls (+) ls (+); lp (-); w (-)
NK 30.9% 1.7% 59.7% 13.9%
NK CES 11.2% 0.7% 55.1% 4.6%
NK WKN 26.5% 9.2% 54.4% 13.3%
NK SM 6.2% 2.8% 46.0% 13.5%
Table 4: Results from prior sensitivity analysis. Percentage of the prior support that matches
all the restrictions.
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Description NK NK CES NK WKN NK SM
Relative Risk Aversion
Inverse of Frish Elasticity of Labor Supply
Investment adjustment costs X X X X
Habits in Consumption X X
Variable Capital Utilization
Calvo price stickiness X X X
Calvo wage stickiness X X X
price markup X X X
wage markup
Interest rate smoothing X X X
Taylor rule response to inflation
Taylor rule response to output
Price Indexation
Wage Indexation
K/L elasticity of substitution X
working capital fraction (labor) X X
Intermediate inputs share in production X
working capital fraction (capital)
working capital fraction (intermediate inputs)
technology diffusion
prob. of barg. session determination
replacement ratio X
hiring fixed cost relative to output %
search cost relative to output %
matching function share of unemployment X
job survival rate X
vacancy filling rate
Table 5: Parameters responsible for matching prior restrictions over quarters 2:5
(black checkmark), 5:8 (red checkmark) and 2:8 (red underlined checkmark).
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Figure 6: The wage stickiness Cumulative Density Function (CDF) on the left panels; in blue
(red) the CDF that does (not) generate a positive response of the labor share. On the right
panels, the combination of random draws from price and wage stickiness that do (not) verify the
labor share IRF in blue (red). From top to bottom, the NK model, the NK CES model, and the
NK WKN model.
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Description NK NK CES NK WKN NK SM
Investment adjustment costs Γ(8, 2)
Habits in Consumption B(0.5, 0.15)
Variable Capital Utilization Γ(0.5, 0.3)
Calvo price stickiness B(0.66, 0.1)
Calvo wage stickiness B(0.66, 0.1) B(0.66, 0.1) B(0.66, 0.1) -
price markup Γ(1.2, 0.05)
Interest rate smoothing B(0.7, 0.15)
Taylor rule response to inflation Γ(1.7, 0.15)
Taylor rule response to output Γ(0.1, 0.05)
Price Indexation B(0.5, 0.15) B(0.5, 0.15) - -
Wage Indexation B(0.5, 0.15) B(0.5, 0.15) - -
K/L elasticity of substitution - N(1, 0.3) - -
working capital fraction (labor) - - B(0.8, 0.1) B(0.8, 0.1)
Intermediate inputs share in production - - B(0.5, 0.1) -
working capital fraction (capital) - - B(0.8, 0.1) -
working capital fraction (intermediate inputs) - - B(0.8, 0.1) -
technology diffusion - - - B(0.5, 0.2)
prob. of barg. session determination - - - Γ(0.5, 0.4)
replacement ratio - - - B(0.4, 0.1)
hiring fixed cost relative to output % - - - Γ(1, 0.3)
search cost relative to output % - - - Γ(0.1, 0.07)
matching function share of unemployment - - - B(0.5, 0.1)
job survival rate - - - B(0.8, 0.1)
MP shock stdev Γ(0.74, 0.05)
Table 6: Priors for Bayesian IRF Matching. Distributions: Γ Gamma, B Beta, N
Normal.
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VAR 68% VAR Mean NK  NK_CES NK_WKN   NK_SM
Figure 7: Bayesian Impulse Responses Matching - SVAR vs DSGE models
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Description NK NK CES NK WKN NK SM
Investment adjustment costs 9.22 (5.78-12.84) 12.3 (6.56-18.9) 10.1 (6.55-13.8) 9.93 (6.39-13.6)
Habits in Consumption 0.78 (0.70-0.86) 0.88 (0.83-0.93) 0.81 (0.75- 0.87) 0.81 (0.74-0.87)
Variable Capital Utilization 0.63 (0.13-1.25) 0.93 (0.15-1.81) 0.73 (0.10-1.49) 0.18 (0.02-0.40)
Calvo price stickiness 0.79 (0.70-0.88) 0.78 (0.66-0.89) 0.66 (0.55-0.77) 0.60 (0.50-0.71)
Calvo wage stickiness 0.89 (0.85-0.94) 0.93 (0.90-0.96) 0.77 (0.66-0.86) -
price markup 1.27 (1.18-1.37) 1.20 (1.10-1.30) 1.25 (1.17-1.34) 1.28 (0.19-1.37)
Interest rate smoothing 0.83 (0.80-0.87) 0.87 (0.84-0.91) 0.86 (0.83-0.89) 0.87 (0.83-0.90)
Taylor rule response to inflation 1.73 (1.45-2.02) 1.70 (1.41-2.00) 1.76 (1.49-2.03) 1.74 (1.47-2.03)
Taylor rule response to output 0.10 (0.01-0.19) 0.07 (0.01-0.14) 0.03 (0.01-0.05) 0.04 (0.01-0.07)
Price Indexation 0.63 (0.35-0.90) 0.59 (0.28-0.87) - -
Wage Indexation 0.47 (0.19-0.75) 0.51 (0.22-0.80) - -
K/L elasticity of substitution - 0.67 (0.03-1.23) - -
working capital fraction (labor) - - 0.71 (0.40-1.00) 0.82 (0.66-0.97)
Intermediate inps share in prod. - - 0.58 (0.44-0.70) -
working capital fraction (capital) - - 0.81 (0.53-1.00) -
working capital fraction (intermediates) - - 0.82 (0.56-1.00) -
technology diffusion - - - 0.50 (0.12-0.87)
prob. of barg. session determination - - - 0.50 (0.002-1.27)
replacement ratio - - - 0.60 (0.39-0.80)
hiring fixed cost relative to output % - - - 1.07 (0.52-1.67)
search cost relative to output % - - - 0.05 (0.001-0.14)
matching function share of unemp. - - - 0.46 (0.27-0.65)
job survival rate - - - 0.33 (0.19-0.48)
MP shock stdev 0.77 (0.71-0.83) 0.76 (0.70-0.81) 0.75 (0.69-0.81) 0.75 (0.70-0.81)
Table 7: Posterior mean of the parameters - Bayesian Impulse Response Matching
as in Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010). 95% HDP interval in parenthesis.
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Appendix
The Missing Link: Monetary Policy and The Labor
Share
Cristiano Cantore, Filippo Ferroni and Miguel A. Leo´n-Ledesma
February 21, 2019
A Main Data Sources and Constructions
In this section we describe the data construction and source separately for each country.
A.1 US
The seven measures used for the US are constructed using data from the BLS and the BEA
NIPA Tables for the time period 1955:Q1-2015:Q3 and are as follows:
1. Labor share 1 : Labor share in the non-farm business sector. This is taken directly
from BLS.1 The series considers only the non-farm business sector. It calculates the
labor share as compensation of employees of the non-farm business sector plus imputed
self-employment income over gross value added of the non-farm business sector. Self-
employment imputed income is calculated as follows: an implicit wage is calculated as
compensation over hours worked and then the imputed labor income is the implicit
wage times the number of hours worked by the self-employed.
2. Labor share 2 : Labor share in the domestic corporate non-financial business sector.
This follows Gomme and Rupert (2004) first alternative measure of the labor share.
The use of data for the non-financial corporate sector only has the advantage of not
having to apportion proprietors income and rental income, two ambiguous components
of factor income. It also considers the wedge introduced between the labor share and
one minus the capital share by indirect taxes (net of subsidies), and only makes use
of unambiguous components of capital income. This approach also takes into account
the definition of aggregate output in constructing the labor share. Usually we use
GDP in constructing measures of the Labor share (as we do for some of the other
proxies), however sectoral studies often use gross value added (GVA) (see Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (2003), Young (2010) and Young (2013)). Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008) and Muck, McAdam, and Growiec (2015) show that factor shares in value
added differ systematically from factor income shares in GDP, albeit with annual data.
By considering gross value added net interest and miscellaneous payments (NIgvat ,
NIPA Table 1.14), gross value added corporate profits (CP gvat , NIPA Table 1.14), net
value added (NV At, NIPA Table 1.14) and gross value added taxes on production and
imports less subsidies (Taxgvat , NIPA Table 1.14) the labor share is thus calculated as:







3. Labor share 3 : This approach deals with imputing ambiguous income for the macroe-
conomy and corresponds to the second alternative measure of the labor share proposed
in Gomme and Rupert (2004). The measure excludes the household and government
1FRED series PRS85006173 provided as an index number.
1
sectors. They define unambiguous labor income (Y UL) as compensation of employees,
and unambiguous capital income (Y UK) as corporate profits, rental income, net interest
income, and depreciation (same series as above from NIPA Tables 1.12 and 1.7.5). The
remaining (ambiguous) components are then proprietors’ income plus indirect taxes
net of subsidies (NIPA Table 1.12). These are apportioned to capital and labor in the
same proportion as the unambiguous components. The resulting labor share measure
is:
Labor Share 3: LSt =
CEt
CEt +RIt + CPt +NIt + δt
=
Y UL
Y UK + Y UL
.
4. Labor share 4 : This is the same as the above Labor Share 3 but not corrected for
inventory valuation adjustment and an adjustment for capital consumption. Using
rental income of persons (without CCAdj) (RIat , NIPA Table 1.12) and corporate
profits before tax (without IVA and CCAdj) (CP at , NIPA Table 1.12):
Labor Share 4: LSt =
CEt
CEt +RIat + CP
a
t +NIt + δt
=
Y UL
Y UK + Y UL
.
5. Labor share 5 : Follows Cooley and Prescott (1995) in dealing with the issue of how to
input mixed income. The labor share of income is defined as one minus capital income
divided by output. To deal with mixed income, they assume that the proportion
of ambiguous capital income to ambiguous income is the same as the proportion of
unambiguous capital income to unambiguous income. It decomposes total income into
two components: ambiguous income (AIt) and unambiguous income (UIt). AIt is the
sum of proprietors income (PIt, NIPA table 1.12), taxes on production less subsidies
(Taxt − Subt, NIPA Table 1.12), business current transfer payments (BCTPt, NIPA
Table 1.12) and statistical discrepancy (Sdist, NIPA Table 1.12). UIt instead can be
easily separated into labor income (CEt) and capital income (UCIt) which consists of
rental income (RIt, NIPA Table 1.12), net interests (NIt, NIPA Table 1.12), current
surplus of government enterprises (GEt, NIPA Table 1.12), and corporate profits (CPt,
NIPA Table 1.12). Using capital depreciation (δt, Consumption of fixed capital NIPA





RIt +NIt +GEt + CPt + δt
RIt +NIt +GEt + CPt + δt + CEt
Here the key assumption is that the share of capital/labor in ambiguous income is the




Labor Share 5: LSt = 1− CSt = 1− UCIt + δt +ACIt
GNPt
where we use Gross National Product instead of GDP (GNPt, NIPA Table 1.7.5).
6. Labor share 6 : Is taken from Fernald (2014) and it’s utilization adjusted quarterly
series. In computing the capital share he assumes that the non-corporate sector has
the same factor shares as the corporate non-financial sector.
7. Labor share 7 : Labor share in the non-finanical corporation sector. This is taken
directly from BLS (FRED series id PRS88003173 provided as an index number). The
series considers only the non-finanical corporations sector.
8. Real wage: Wages and Salaries from NIPA 1.12 deflated by CPI and divided by hours
worked in the total economy from Valery Ramey dataset.
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9. Labor productivity : Ratio between GDP and total hours from Ramey.
The remaining US variables are downloaded from the FRED database and their series ID
is in parenthesis unless specified differently. For GDP we use Real Gross Domestic product
(GDPC1). GDP deflator is the implicit price deflator of gross domestic product (GDPDEF).
For CPI we used Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers and all Items for US (CPI-
AUCSL). For the price of commodity index we used the same CRB SPOT commodity index
used by Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) and downloaded from datastream. Money growth is
the M2 for United states from the IMF database in log difference (MYAGM2USM052N).
Federal Funds rates are downloaded from FRED database. Time span of the VAR analysis
is the great moderation period in US, i.e. 1984Q1 to 2007Q4. We have also performed
sensitivity analysis using GDP and deflator from the Non-Farm business sector and Non-
Financial corporate sector and core CPI of all items excluding energy and we get similar
results for the response of the labor share.2 In section 2.1 we also use data on real wages and
labor productivity. Real wages are computed by dividing Wages and Salaries from NIPA
1.12 (A4102C1Q027SBEA) by hours worked in the total economy from Ramey dataset and
the CPI. Labor productivity is computed as the ratio between GDP and total hours from
Ramey. Using real hourly compensation and hours worked in the non-farm business sector
and/or the non-financial corporation sector does not affect the results. Data used in section
2.1 different from the ones above are the following. For GDP we use Nonfinancial Corpora-
tions Sector: Real Output (PRS88003043). GDP deflator is the Nonfinancial Corporations
Sector: Implicit Price Deflator (PRS88003143). Instead of CPI here we use the implicit
priced deflator constructed implicitly from Nonfinancial Corporations Sector: Real Hourly
Compensation (PRS88003153) and Nominal Hourly Compensation (PRS88003103). Labor
productivity is Nonfinancial Corporations Sector: Real Output Per Hour (PRS88003093)
and Hours Worked in the Nonfinancial Corporations Sector (PRS88003033). Finally, data on
Capacity utilization and relative price of investment are the same used in Altig et al. (2011).
A.2 Australia
We use quarterly data for the 1959:Q3-2016:Q1 from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. We
construct five alternative measures of labor share. The first two are total wages and salaries
(including social security contributions) over GDP (AUS LS1) or over total factor income
(AUS LS2). The third one is one minus gross operating surplus of private non-financial
corporations as a percentage of total factor income (AUS LS3). Fourth, one minus gross
operating surplus of private non-financial corporations plus all financial corporations as a
percentage of total factor income (AUS LS4). The last measure is given by (total income
minus surplus of all corporations minus gross operating surplus of government minus mixed
income imputed to capital)/total income (AUS LS5). For real wages we divide nominal
compensation of employees by the CPI (from Australian Bureau of Statistics) and the mea-
sure of total hours worked constructed by Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Labor productivity is
computed as the ratio between real GDP and total hours from Ohanian and Raffo (2012).
For Real GDP and its deflator we use data from the OECD quarterly national accounts. For
CPI we used OECD consumer prices of all goods and also the short term interest rates come
from the OECD database. For the price of commodity index we used the same index used
for the other countries. Money growth is constructed using money supply downloaded from
datastream. In section 2.1 we constructed, from OECD national accounts, a proxy for real
wages by dividing nominal compensation of employees by the CPI and the measure of total
hours worked. Labor productivity is computed as the ratio between real GDP and total
hours. Time span for the VAR analysis is 1985:Q1-2009:Q4 .
2Results available upon request.
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A.3 Canada
We consider quarterly data for the 1981:Q2-2016:Q1 period from Statistics Canada. We
used two alternative measures. First, compensation of employees over total factor income
(GDP corrected by taxes and subsidies) (CAN LS1) . Second, we imputed mixed income in
the same proportion as unambiguous labor and capital income, and added it to the previous
measure of labor income (CAN LS2) . For real wages we divide nominal compensation
of employees by the CPI (from Statistics Canada) and the measure of total hours worked
constructed by Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Labor productivity is computed as the ratio
between real GDP and total hours from Ohanian and Raffo (2012). For Real GDP and
its deflator we use data from the OECD quarterly national accounts. For CPI we used
OECD consumer prices of all goods and also the short term interest rates come from the
OECD database.For the price of commodity index we used the same index used for the other
countries. Money growth is constructed using money supply downloaded from datastream.In
section 2.1 we constructed, from OECD national accounts, a proxy for real wages by dividing
nominal compensation of employees by the CPI and the measure of total hours worked
constructed by Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Labor productivity is computed as the ratio
between real GDP and total hours from Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Time span for the VAR
analysis is 1985:Q1-2011:Q1.
A.4 UK
Quarterly data for the 1971:Q1-2016:Q1 period from the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
We used one measure of the labor share: compensation of employees (DTWM) over gross
value added at factor costs (CGCB) (UK LS). For real wages we divide nominal compensa-
tion of employees by the CPI (from ONS) and the measure of total hours worked constructed
by Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Labor productivity is computed as the ratio between real GDP
and total hours from Ohanian and Raffo (2012). From the ONS we take Gross Domestic
Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted (ABMI) and Implied deflator for
Gross domestic product at market prices (YBGB). From the OECD we take the CPI of all
items and the short term interest rates. The price of commodity index is the same used
for the US. Money growth is constructed using money supply downloaded from datastream
(UKCMS2..B). In section 2.1 we constructed a proxy for real wages by dividing nominal
compensation of employees by the CPI and the measure of total hours worked constructed
by Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Labor productivity is computed as the ratio between real
GDP and total hours from Ohanian and Raffo (2012). Time span for the VAR analysis is
1986:Q1-2008:Q1.
A.5 EA
We take most of the data from the AWM database, where we use the following variables, real
GDP and the GDP deflator, HICP excluding energy (seasonally adjusted) and the Short-
term interest. The price of commodity index is the same used for the US. Money growth
is taken from the IMF database on FRED (MYAGM2EZQ196N). We used one measure of
the labor share: compensation of employees over GDP at factor costs. Real wages are given
by nominal compensation of employees divided by the CPI (both from OECD Quarterly
National Accounts) and the measure of total employment from the New Area Wide Model
Database. For labor productivity we take the ratio between real GDP and total employment
from the New Area Wide Model Database. In section 2.1 we also use as a proxy for real wages
nominal compensation of employees from the OECD divided by HICP excluding energy and
the measure of total employment from AWM. For labor productivity we take the ratio
4
between real GDP and total employment from AWM. Time span of the VAR analysis is
1999Q1 to 2011Q3.
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Figure A1: Labor share proxies for US, Australia and Canada.
6
B VAR Robustness
The response of the labor share after a monetary policy tightening under different information
set, time span, labor share proxies and identification scheme are summarized in Table D1.




Cholesky Figure D1 All Proxies
Extended Cholesky Figure D2 All Proxies
Baseline Signs Figure D7 All Proxies
Baseline Instruments Figures D10-D15 All Proxies
Baseline 65-07 Cholesky Figure D4 All Proxies




Cholesky Figure 2 Yes




Cholesky Figure 2 Yes




Cholesky Figure D6 All Proxies




Cholesky Figure D5 All Proxies
Baseline Signs Figure D8 All Proxies
Table D1: Summary of the robustness exercises with the VAR specification. Baseline = log of
real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator, the log of an index of commodity prices, log of the CPI,
the log of the labor share, short term interest rates, and M2 growth. Extended = Baseline and
real consumption and investment.
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Figure D1: Impulse Response Function normalized to a 1% increase in the short term interest
rate using recursive Cholesky. All Labor Share proxies US. 1984Q1-2007Q4
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Figure D2: Impulse Response Function normalized to a 1% increase in the short term interest
rate using recursive Cholesky and Extended Information Set (including real consumption and
investment). All Labor Share proxies US. 1984Q1-2007Q4.
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Figure D3: Impulse Response Function normalized to a 1% increase in the short term interest rate
using recursive Cholesky. Baseline information set. All Labor Share proxies US. 1965Q3-1995Q3
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Figure D4: Impulse Response Function normalized to a 1% increase in the short term interest rate
using recursive Cholesky. Baseline information set. All Labor Share proxies US. 1965Q3-2007Q4
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Figure D5: Impulse Response Function normalized to a 1% increase in the short term interest
rate using recursive Cholesky. All Labor Share proxies Australia.
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Figure D6: Impulse Response Function normalized to a 1% increase in the short term interest
rate using recursive Cholesky. All Labor Share proxies Canada.
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Figure D7: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on sign restrictions. All Labor Share proxies US.
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Figure D8: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on sign restrictions. All Labor Share proxies Australia.















































































































































Figure D9: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on sign restrictions. All Labor Share proxies Canada.
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Figure D10: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on the Instrumental Variable VAR. Labor Share proxy
LS1.

























































































































































































































Figure D11: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on the Instrumental Variable VAR. Labor Share proxy
LS3.
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Figure D12: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on the Instrumental Variable VAR. Labor Share proxy
LS4.



























































































































































































































Figure D13: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
interest rate using an identification scheme based on the Instrumental Variable VAR. Labor Share proxy
LS5.
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Figure D14: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal
















































































































































































































Figure D15: Impulse Response Functions normalized to a one percent increase in the short term nominal




The results using different measures of the labor share, different countries, and identification
methods, show a robust increase in the labor share after an MP contraction. We now look
at whether this effect is also robust across sectors. I.e., it may be the case that the increase
in the labor share is due to changes in the composition of output from sectors with low to
sectors with high labor shares rather than a change of the labor share within sectors.
To do this, we exploit the cross-section and time-series variation of labor shares at the
disaggregated sector level. Define the (log) labor share for sector i at time t as LSHi,t, and
the (cross-section invariant) aggregate monetary policy shock as MPt. We can estimate the
impact of the shock on sectoral labor shares by running the following panel model:
LSHi,t = αi + αt + ρLSHi,t−1 + θMPt + i,t, (1)
where αi and αt are sector and time-specific fixed effects, and i,t is an error term. The
fixed effects capture unobserved sector characteristics that are time-invariant, whereas the
time-effect captures aggregate time variation in the labor share that is independent of the
sector. Coefficient θ then captures the contemporaneous effect of the MP shock on the labor
share controlling for past values of the labor share as well as sector and time fixed effects.1
To capture the effect of the MP shock on the labor share after the shock, we estimate:
LSHi,t+h = αi + αt+h + ρLSHi,t+h−1 + θhMPt + i,t+h. (2)
with h = 1, 2, 3, 4. Coefficient θh then captures the effect of the MP shock at time t on
the labor share t+ h periods ahead. The time profile of the θh coefficients thus gives us an
impulse response for the labor share at the sectoral level.
C.1 Data
We use two databases for the US economy. The first one is the NBER-CES productivity
database. This annual database covers a highly disaggregated split of the US manufacturing
sector. The second is the Klems database that has a less disaggregated split by sectors but
covers not only manufacturing but all sectors in the economy including services.
The labor share at the sector level is defined as compensation of employees over value
added, which is the only available proxy. After eliminating sectors for which the labor share
exceeded one in any period, we are left with 464 sectors for the CES-NBER database, and
30 sectors for Klems.
The measure of MPt is obtained by aggregating quarterly shocks from the Cholesky
SVAR using aggregate data. We also used the Romer and Romer monetary surprise in-
strument as a cross-check. The sample period is 1985-2007 for the NBER database and
1987-2007 for the Klems database as compensation of employees is only available from that
point onwards.
Pre-tests showed that, using the NBER data, the model displayed heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. Hence the standard errors reported are robust clustered standard errors.
For the Klems data, as well as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, there were signs
of contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation. Thus, the standard errors are estimated
following Driscoll and Kraay (1998). The error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic,
autocorrelated up to one lag, and correlated between the sectors. Time effects appeared to
be significant in all specifications. This is consistent with the general fall in the labor share
experienced by all sectors as is evidenced by figure E1. Between 1985 and 2007, the labor
share falls in the manufacturing sector by 10 percentage points.
1With yearly data, a single lag appears to be sufficient to capture the persistence of the labor share. Adding
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LSH LSH_mean
Figure E1: Average and dispersion of (log) labor shares in the NBER productivity database,
1985-2007.
C.2 Results
The results from the estimated θh for horizons h = 1, ..., 5 for the NBER database are
reported in figure E2, where t1 represents the contemporaneous effect. The MP shock leads
to a significant increase in the labor share on impact and a further increase in the second
year. The effect then falls as the horizon increases. Quantitatively, the impact is similar to
that obtained from the aggregate VAR, although slightly less pronounced. The shape is also
consistent with the aggregate results, where the labor share peaks between quarters 5 and
10 after the shock. Figure E3 shows the results using the Romer and Romer proxy. In this
case, the effect is positive, peaks in quarter 3, and quantitatively similar to the aggregate
results. However, the effect at h = 5 is strongly negative, which differs from the results using
aggregate data. Finally, figure E4 presents the results using the Cholesky SVAR proxy for
MP shocks and using the Klems database. The standard errors are larger given the much
smaller sample size. On impact, the effect is not significant, but the labor share increases
one year later and then falls, though not monotonically. The quantitative impact is smaller
than using aggregate data, however, it is still positive and significant one and three years
after the shock. These results, thus, confirm that the increase in the labor share after a MP
contraction is also a feature that occurs within sectors and not the result of cross-sectional


























t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
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Figure E2: Coefficient on monetary policy shock variable (Cholesky VAR) using the NBER man-
ufacturing database (464 manufacturing sectors). Period is 1985-2007. The plot shows the coef-






















t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
Horizon (years)
Figure E3: Coefficient on monetary policy shock variable (Romer and Romer) using the NBER
manufacturing database (464 manufacturing sectors). Period is 1985-2007. The plot shows the


























t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
Horizon (years)
Figure E4: Coefficient on monetary policy shock variable (Cholesky VAR) using the Klems
database (30 sectors). Period is 1987-2007. The plot shows the coefficient on the year of im-
pact (t1) and four years after.
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D Composition Bias corrected measures for the US.
Here we present results using the same baseline cholesky specification used in the paper
substituting the labor share in turn with data on aggregate wages in the US and composition
bias corrected measures of wage as constructed by Haefke, Sonntag, and Van-Rens (2013).
The sample is 1984-2006 as their datasets stops in 2006.1 For details about data construction
we refer the reader to the original paper of Haefke, Sonntag, and Van-Rens (2013).
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Adjusted Mean Wage - Newly Hired
Aggregate Wage
Composition Bias corrected measures
Figure F1: Impulse Response Functions comparing the response of Aggregate Wages in the US and
composition bias corrected measures for all and newly hired workers.
1In their original dataset there are 4 missing observations in the sample. We interpolate the data but our results
are robust to this interpolation.
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E Theory
E.1 The labor share in NK theory
Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2007) and Nekarda and Ramey (2013), amongst others,
have discussed extensively the inverse relationship between the labor share and the price
markup in this set up. We review the intuition of this result starting from the simplest
possible NK model here.
We can define the labor share in log-linear deviation from the steady state as
sht = wt + ht − yt, (1)
where wt is the real wage, ht is hours worked and yt is output. We start by assuming perfect
competition in the labor market and hence labor is paid its marginal product. Hence:
wt = θt + yt − ht, (2)
where θt are real marginal costs coming from the assumption of monopolistic competition in
the product market and are not constant given the standard Calvo price staggering setup.
Combining (1) and (2) we get that
sht = θt. (3)





where λ is the slope of the PC and pit is inflation. A temporary decline in inflation (tighter
MP) will see marginal costs (labor share) decline and markups increase.
This result is quite general and does not depend on nominal wage rigidities, factor adjust-
ment costs,1 and financial frictions.2 As it is well known, after a MP tightening households
will reduce current consumption given the increase in the real interest rate and, because
prices are not flexible, marginal costs have to decline to ensure that supply follows demand.
As marginal costs will decline more than prices the price markup will increase and hence the
labor share will always be procyclical no matter the assumption on wage rigidity.3
Given that the introduction of nominal wage rigidities alone does not help to get the
right response of the labor share in the NK model, we proceed by looking at two extensions
that can break the equality in equation (3) and at the same time go in the direction of
producing a more pro-cyclical response of labor productivity compared to the one of real
wages, consistent with the empirical results in section 2.1.
1For example labor adjustment costs would introduce a wedge, clt between the labor share and marginal costs
sht = θt − clt. With convex adjustment costs it is easy to show that this wedge will move procyclically on impact
of a MP shock and then counter-cyclically in subsequent periods. It follows from previous equation then that this
could only lead to a procyclical labor share on impact but not in subsequent periods. Derivation details available
upon request.
2In the form of a wedge between the real interest rate and the return to capital.
3Broer et al. (forthcoming) have shown that, in this model, the presence of wage rigidities is crucial in order to
get a transmission mechanism of monetary policy consistent with the data. Their focus is, however, on the response
of the level of profits which can be shown to switch sign when sticky wages are particularly strong. Here, instead,
the focus is on the shares and, in this set up, abstracting from capital, the profit share is exactly the opposite
of the labor share and moves always counter-cyclically given the counter-cyclicality of the markup. Equation (3)
shows that this result is independent of the assumption of wage stickiness.
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E.2 The labor share and CES production
It is worth noting that the result above is true in an economy with or without capital
accumulation provided that the production function is either Cobb-Douglas or linear in
labor. However, as Gal´ı, Gertler, and Lo´pez-Salido (2007) and Nekarda and Ramey (2013)
show, a CES production function provides a simple way of introducing a wedge between the
labor share and the marginal costs:
sCESt = θt +
1− σ
σ
(yt − ht), (5)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. We consider this specifi-
cation in the NK CES model of Cantore et al. (2015).
In what follows, for ease of exposition, we will assume that the production function is
linear in labor.4 Given a linear production function with labor as the only variable input
(yt = ht) now the real wage is also equal to the labor share and real marginal costs:
wt = s
h
t = θt. (6)
E.3 The labor share and fixed costs in production
Nekarda and Ramey (2013) also discuss two further production function generalizations that
are able to break down (3): overhead and overtime labor. Both specifications introduce a
wedge between the average wage and the marginal product of labor, which is a necessary
condition to be able to generate impulse responses in line with our empirical evidence.
However the procyclicality of marginal costs still dominates quantitatively the response
of the labor share to a MP shock. Moreover it can be showed that inclusion of fixed costs in
production to ensure no entry in steady state, as usually assumed in DSGE models, acts in
the same way as the presence of overhead labor in production. Consider again a NK economy
with a simple linear production in labor with the presence of fixed costs F : Yt = Ht−F . In
log deviations from the steady state the labor share is now:




Given that hours (output) responds procyclically to a MP shock then the higher FY the higher
the wedge between labor share and marginal costs.5 Numerical results show that this might
work only on impact and for implausibly high values of FY .
E.4 The cost-push channel of Monetary Policy
The cost-push channel introduces a direct effect of the nominal interest rate (rnt) on the
marginal cost and it has been used in the literature in order to explain the well-known price
puzzle after a MP shock and to reproduce the pro-cyclical price markup documented by
Nekarda and Ramey (2013).
Following the set up of Ravenna and Walsh (2006), we can augment the basic NK model
with Calvo pricing by adding a credit channel and the cost of working capital by assuming
a cash in advance constraint for the firms. The need to finance in advance their working
capital (wage bill) induces need for credit from financial intermediaries.
In this set up, the real wage is now given by
4Assuming a decreasing returns to scale production function yt = αht does not change the results.
5This is also the reason why sometimes estimated DSGE models find a very large proportion of fixed costs in
production (see Smets and Wouters (2007)).
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wt = θt + yt − ht − rnt.6 (8)
This implies that, in this model, the labor share is given by
wt = s
h
t = θt − rnt. (9)
This channel is thus able to break up the link between the labor share and the price
markup. Because the marginal cost now depends on the cost of financing working capital, as
shown in Phaneuf, Sims, and Victor (2018), the markup can become pro-cyclical consistent
with the evidence in Nekarda and Ramey (2013). However, as the nominal interest rate moves
counter-cyclically by definition, the direct effect of rnt in (9) reinforces the pro-cyclicality of
the labour share. Hence we need to rely on numerical simulations to check which of the two
competing effects dominates.
E.5 Search and Matching
We now turn our attention to labor market frictions in the form of search and matching.
While in the paper we use the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2016) that
uses alternate offer bargaining is easier to present here the intuition of this channel using
the more standard Nash bargaining model as in Gal´ı (2010). In this set up, real wages
are not set competitively but are the result of a bilateral Nash bargaining process between
workers and firms, while an aggregate matching function explains the evolution of aggregate
employment. Hence now equation 2 is no longer true and wt 6= θt + lpt. It follows then that
sht 6= θt. The dynamics of the labor share will differ since now wages and marginal product
of labor behave differently. Considering only the extensive margin here and again a linear
production function yt = nt we can see how the labor share is now given by:
sht = wt 6= θt. (10)
Hence to generate an increase in the labor share the only possibility is to have a counter-
factual response of wages to a monetary policy shock. Without wage rigidities, it would be
difficult for wages to display a positive response given that the bargaining power of workers
is bounded by one. The combination of both nominal wage and labor market rigidities,
instead, proves to be enough to generate a positive response of real wages. Of course the
introduction of capital and further real rigidities might overturn this result in larger DSGE
model. Once again this can only be checked using numerical techniques as we do in the main
body of the paper.
6This follows the log-lnearization of equation (6) in Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
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F SVAR with model simulated data
Here we check the ability of the recursive SVAR to reproduce the model impulse responses to
a MP shock. To do so, following Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005), we first simulate interest
rate, output, price, and labor share data from the model using a parameterization that
produces a significant and persistent procyclical response of the labor share to a MP shock.7
We then estimate the SVAR model using a sample of 150 observations of this synthetic
data and, finally, compare the IRFs arising from the SVAR to those arising directly from
the DSGE model. We do so for the four models considered in the main text. To make
models comparable, and to allow for the invertibility of the VAR, we simulate all models
with 4 shocks. We set the standard deviation of the MP shock to 1% and for the rest of the
shocks to 0.01%. Note that the aim of this exercise is to check whether the SVAR is able
to identify the key shock for our analysis and, thus, we are not inferring anything about the
identification of other structural shocks. The comparison between SVAR and model IRFs
is presented in figure G1, where the thick black line is the model IRF and SVAR IRF is
presented with 68% confidence sets.
7This is obtained by assuming a degree of price stickiness substantially larger than wage stickiness (0.75 vs 0.5
respectively) in each model. All other parameters are standard.
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Figure G1: Thicker black line is the true IRF.
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G Monte Carlo Filtering
As in the prior predictive analysis, a random sample of the prior8 is drawn and the associated
model-implied statistics of interest are computed. Then, based on a set of constraints (e.g.
rank conditions or signs of impulse responses), a categorization is defined for each MC model
realization as lying either within or outside the target region. The terms behavior (B) or
non-behavior (B¯) are used in the MCF literature. The B− B¯ categorization is mapped back
onto the input structural parameters, each of which is thus also partitioned into a B and B¯
sub-sample. Given a full set of N Monte Carlo runs, one obtains two subsets: (Ψi|B) of size
n and (Ψi|B¯) of size n¯, where n + n¯ = N and Ψi, for i = 1, .., k, are model parameters. In
general, the two sub-samples will come from different unknown probability density functions:
fn(Ψi|B) of size n and fn¯(Ψi|B¯) of size n¯.
In order to identify the parameters that mostly drive the DSGE model into the target
behavior, the distributions fn and fn¯ are compared for each parameter independently. The
Montecarlo sampling allows us to avoid computing analytical integration over the remaining
parameters. If for a given parameter Ψi the two distributions are significantly different, then
Ψi is a key factor driving the model behavior and there will be clearly identifiable subsets
of values in its predefined range that are more likely to fall under B than under B¯. If the
two distributions are not significantly different, then Ψi is unimportant and any value in
its predefined range is likely to fall either in B than under B¯. Ideally, we are comparing
the supports of the conditional cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of a parameter and
compute the distance under standard statistical metrics. The Smirnov two-sample test (two-
sided version) provides us with a statistical concept of distance. The lower the α associated
to the Smirnoff test, the more likely is to reject the null hypothesis that the CDF (Ψi|B)
is equal to the CDF (Ψi|B¯). The B and B¯ subsets can be further inspected through bi-
dimensional projections, in order to detect patterns characterizing two-way interactions.
The standard procedure consists of computing the correlation coefficients ρij between all
parameters under the B and B¯ subsets, and plotting the bi-dimensional projections of the
sample for the couples having |ρij | larger than a significance threshold.
2:5 quarters
Parameter D-Stat P-value
price markup 0.529 0.000
Calvo price stickiness 0.494 0.000
Calvo wage stickiness 0.420 0.000
Investment adjustment costs 0.333 0.001
5:8 quarters
price markup 0.187 0.000
Calvo price stickiness 0.187 0.000
Investment adjustment costs 0.170 0.000
Interest rate smoothing 0.163 0.000
Table H1: Smirnov statistics in driving prior restrictions NK




Calvo wage stickiness 0.842 0.000
Calvo price stickiness 0.632 0.000
K/L elasticity of substitution 0.519 0.001
5:8 quarters
Investment adjustment costs 0.343 0.000
Interest rate smoothing 0.249 0.000
Calvo wage stickiness 0.238 0.000
Habits in Consumption 0.217 0.000
Calvo price stickiness 0.209 0.001
Table H2: Smirnov statistics in driving prior restrictions NK CES
2:5 quarters
Parameter D-Stat P-value
Intermediate inputs share in production 0.335 0.000
price markup 0.333 0.000
Calvo wage stickiness 0.296 0.000
Calvo price stickiness 0.240 0.000
working capital fraction (labor) 0.227 0.000
habits in consumption 0.166 0.001
Interest rate smoothing 0.165 0.001
5:8 quarters
Intermediate inputs share in production 0.327 0.000
price markup 0.309 0.000
Calvo price stickiness 0.215 0.000
Calvo wage stickiness 0.213 0.000
Interest rate smoothing 0.202 0.001
Investment adjustment costs 0.189 0.000
Table H3: Smirnov statistics in driving prior restrictions NK WKN
2:5 quarters
Parameter D-Stat P-value
working capital fraction (labor) 0.442 0.000
job survival rate 0.429 0.000
price markup 0.419 0.000
matching function share of unemployment 0.408 0.000
replacement ratio 0.271 0.001
5:8 quarters
price markup 0.281 0.000
working capital fraction (labor) 0.257 0.000
Investment adjustment costs 0.235 0.000
matching function share of unemployment 0.232 0.000
replacement ratio 0.199 0.000
Table H4: Smirnov statistics in driving prior restrictions NK SM
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